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In 2016 there were several events that could change the Philippines' foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia. The tensions in the South China Sea were growing since several parties 
claimed the sea, and there were new presidents elected in the Philippines and the United 
States. This thesis focuses on the Philippines' strategy in this complicated geopolitical 
situation between the two great powers, the United States of America and China.  
 
The aim of this thesis was to identify how the Philippines respond to the changing 
geopolitical dynamics in the region after 2016 in the case of the South China Sea and which 
strategy they are using in their actions. The author explains the situation in the region, defines 
a small state, and then discusses the potential strategies a small state has in the case. The 
author set a hypothesis that the Philippines mainly use a hedging strategy to respond to the 
region's geopolitical dynamics. 
 
To test the hypothesis, the author conducted content analysis on the Philippines president 
Rodrigo Duterte's speeches, statements, interviews, and press conferences between 2016-
2020. There were used official sources from the presidential web page. The purpose was to 
find statements related to the United States, China, or the South China Sea and identify the 
strategies.  
 
The author confirmed the hypothesis. Several strategies were used to maneuver in this 
complicated geopolitical situation, such as balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, and 
engaging. According to the theoretical part and Duterte's statements, the main strategy used 
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The aim of this thesis is to focus on how the Philippines respond to the changing geopolitical 
dynamics in the region after 2016 in the case of the South China Sea and which strategy they 
are using in their actions. The topic is important because it shows the options for a small 
state in the rivalry between great powers. The Philippines' actions can be used as an example 
for other small states in a similar situation. The hypothesizes of this thesis is that the 
Philippines mainly use a hedging strategy to respond to the region's geopolitical dynamics. 
To test the hypothesis, the author analyzes the Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte 
Statements. This finding is important because it can confirm the theoretical argument that 
small states tend to hedge against great powers in the region to secure their interest first.  
 
The first chapter of the thesis is about the theoretical background. In the beginning, the 
author gives an overview of the situation in the region. After that, the author defines a small 
state and then discusses the potential strategies a small state has. The second chapter in the 
thesis is about the empirical part. In the beginning, the author explains the method of the 
thesis. After that, the author refers to the Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte's statements 
from the official presidential sources and analyzes whether the Philippines are using 
balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, or some other strategy in their geopolitical situation.  
 
The year 2016 has been chosen mainly because of three potential events. The first one is the 
new president Rodrigo Duterte elected in June 2016 (CNN Philippines, 2016). The second 
one is the new president of the United States, Donald Trump, elected in November 2016 
(Politico, 2016). These changes are influential because the bilateral relationship between the 
United States and the Philippines has been historically strong and was considered a special 
relationship (Suhrke, 1975: 88). This rhetoric has changed after the elections. It is essential 
to understand where the Philippines are heading now and with whom they are cooperating. 
The third reason is related to disputes between the Philippines and China in the South China 
Sea and the Philippines' victory over China on July 12 in 2016, on a claim brought against 
China by the Philippines under the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea 
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(UNCLOS) (Panda, 2016). The Permanent Court decided to rule in favor of the Philippines 
of Arbitration at the Hague (Panda, 2016). 
 
The decision is significant because the South China Sea has been a problematic area in the 
region for a long time. After all, different countries claim the territory in the sea. For 
example, the major countries included in the disputes are Brunei, China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam (Straitstimes, 2016). There are many different 
reasons why so many countries are interested in the South China Sea. It is valuable because 
one-third of the global shipping passes the sea (chinapower.csis.org, 2017), affecting the 
countries nearby and their economic security. Another reason why it is also beneficial is 
because of the natural resources, which make more countries interested in the area (Song 
2019: 424). China is especially interested in creating artificial islands for military purposes 
(Song, 2019: 440). Because of the decision made in favor of the Philippines, there might be 


















1. Theoretical framework 
In this chapter, the author will present the theoretical framework of the thesis. To answer 
how a small state responds to great power contestation, the author briefly opens the 
Philippines' background with the United States and China, then discusses the definition of a 
small state and whether the Philippines is a small state. After that, the author discusses about 
the possible options and strategies a small state has in the situation of great power rivalry.  
Based on the literature, there are several options which strategy the Philippines can choose 
in their decision-making processes as a small state. By explaining the different strategies, 
this discussion helps to find the most probable choice.  
 
Southeast Asia, in general, is usually using a mix of different strategies (Roy, 2005: 306). 
Three main strategies are balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging (Koga, 2018: 633). There 
are also other options for the small states. This thesis focuses on the strategies suitable for 
small states and tries to determine which one the Philippines are using. There is a conflict 
between two great powers, the United States and China, because of the South China Sea. 
China wants to claim the sea and the United States wants to avoid that by emphasizing that 
there must be freedom of navigation and prevents military escalation in the sea (Global 
conflict tracker/conflict territorial disputes south china sea, 2020). Since the Philippines are 
also part of the South China Sea disputes, they need to choose whether they stay in this 
conflict alone, continue cooperation with the United States, warm up relations with China, 
or find another solution. 
 
1.1 The background: Philippines' relationship with the United States and 
China 
The Philippines have constantly ranked the United States as one of the favorite countries in 
the world (Global Indicators Database, 2020). In 2015 during Barack Obama's presidency, 
92% of Filipinos viewed The United States favorably, and 94% were having confidence in 
the President (Global Indicators Database, 2020). That made the Philippines the most pro-
American country in the world. After Rodrigo Duterte's elections, this relationship started to 
change its course. Duterte is supportive of a different foreign policy that is less dependent 
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on the United States and prioritizes closer relations with China (Blanchard, 2016). Since the 
Philippines is one of the oldest Asian partners of the United States, this change might have 
severe consequences in the region (Parameswaran, 2017). The Philippines and China 
relationships are mainly negatively influenced by their territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea (Blanchard, 2016). They have a dispute over the sovereignty of some islands and shoals 
in the Spratly Islands (Loja 2016: 313). In recent years China has started more aggressively 
reclaim islands and tries to militarize the land in the South China Sea (Global conflict 
tracker/conflict territorial disputes south china sea, 2020). 
After Duerte's elections, the Philippines are maneuvering between the two superpowers 
China and the United States. For both parties, it's crucial to show their presence in the region. 
For the United States, it is essential to establish their presence in the South China Sea for 
balancing China's power (Jennings, 2020). Territorial disputes between the Philippines and 
China in the South China sea can potentially initiate war in the region. For China, it is 
essential to hold close ties with the Philippines to reduce the United States presence in the 
South China Sea (Jennings, 2020). In 2016 China invested 24 billion dollars in the 
Philippines economy, and that might be one motivation for Duterte to keep positive relations 
with China (Jennings, 2020). It seems that the Philippines' foreign policy tries to hold good 
relations with both superpowers China and the United States because China is giving the 
money and the United States is supporting the Philippines in the South China Sea. Neither 
China nor the United States is interested in having another powerful country in the region. 
These geopolitical maneuverings by China and the United States put the Philippines in a 
difficult position. They have to respond strategically to the geopolitical dynamics between 
two great powers, which brings us to the main question this thesis addresses: how a small 
state like the Philippines responds to the geopolitical contestation between great powers in 
the region?  
 
1.2 The theory of small states 
There is no one fixed conceptual definition of a small state, and there are many different 
options for defining it. There are mainly two categories to define a small state: absolute and 
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relative (Radoman, 2018: 180). The absolute category consists of upper limits, for example, 
10-15 million inhabitants in economically advanced states or 20-30 million in under-
developed states (Radoman, 2018: 181). Since the Philippines have approximately 110 
million people (Worldometers, 2021), this is not the classification category. Radoman refers 
to Rothstein (1968) and explains that the second category is that small states are not able to 
secure their safety on their own in the option of their leaders (Radoman, 2018: 181). Since 
Duterte has said that the Philippines cannot defend themselves alone, this is more applicable 
definition (Duterte, 2018).  Small states are incapable of making a significant impact on the 
international system alone, but they may influence it with unilateral or multilateral actions 
(Keohane, 1969: 295). This definition is also suitable because, in the South China Sea, the 
Philippines can fight against China with its allies. Radoman refers to Long (2017) and 
explains that there is also a need to consider different relations states have and their dynamics 
(Radoman, 2018: 181). Although small states might not have so many resources as the big 
ones, constructivists see that smallness can also be an advantage or an asset in international 
relations because this may lead to policy options available for small states (Radoman, 2018: 
182). Radoman refers to Krause and Singer (2001) that small states are also those whose 
diplomatic and material resources are limited and they need to concentrate on safeguarding 
territorial integrity rather than more far-reaching goals (Radoman, 2018: 182). Radoman also 
refers to Hey and brings out that there is no need for a clear definition and suggests a concept 
(Radoman, 2018: 182). The concept bases on the perception of the state, self-perception of 
the state leaders and population about their position in the international hierarchy (Radoman, 
2018: 182). Duterte has said that his state is very small (Duterte, 2019). This confirms that 
the Philippines president has a self-perception that the Philippines are considered a small 
state.  
 
According to the literature, the Hey suggested concept and the relative category by Radoman 
are the most applicable definition in this work context. The reason is that the Philippines 
president says that the Philippines is a small state and emphasizes the importance of allies 
and cooperation, which also means that they cannot defend themselves alone if needed and 
consider themselves as a small state. These definitions show that the Philippines is a small 
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state and the author moves to a discussion about the potential strategies applicable for a small 
state. There are several possible options for a small state, and the first one author discusses 
is balancing.  
  
1.3 The theory of balancing  
One potential strategy is balancing, which means that there will be used specific measures, 
for example, shifting resources to strengthen the capability of defense to prevent one country 
from becoming a hegemon (Roy, 2005: 306). There are also other types of balancing, for 
example, institutional balancing, soft-balancing, cautious- balancing, internal balancing, 
external balancing (Koga, 2018: 634-637), high-intensity balancing, and low-intensity 
balancing (Roy, 2005; 306). According to the balance of power theory, balancing is the 
default strategy every state uses (Koga, 2018: 639).  Internal balancing is when the state 
shifts its resource allocations to strengthen its defensive capability (Roy 2005: 306). In the 
Philippines situation, it means they should channel more resources to buy military equipment 
to protect their part of the sea. However, this includes a risk of maldistribution of internal 
resources (Koga, 2018: 637). Internal balancing is more likely to be used in states with higher 
GDP (Lieber and Alexander, 2005: 118). External balancing means that the state cooperates 
with another state with the same potential adversary (Roy, 2005: 306). In the Philippines 
context, it means they should ally with the United States against China. With external 
balancing, there is a risk of entrapment or abandonment (Snyder, 1984: 471-472). Roy refers 
to Khong (2004) that according to soft balancing strategy in Southeast Asia, it means that 
countries in the region except China are encouraging the United States to maintain their 
military presence, but they are not establishing formal military cooperation (Roy, 2005: 
310). Balancing strategy also depends on the intensity. There are distinguished low-intensity 
balancing and high-intensity balancing (Roy, 2005: 306). In low-intensity balancing, the 
state attempts to maintain a constructive relationship with the targeted state (Roy, 2005: 
306). The Philippines are using low-intensity balancing with the United States against China 
(Roy, 2005: 314). In high-intensity balancing, the relationship between balancing and 
targeted state is not so friendly and cooperative (Roy, 2005: 306). It is more adversarial and 
may include political tensions (Roy, 2005: 306). Since China has a more powerful military, 
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this does not seem a reasonable option because it may grow tensions and lead to serious 
conflict.  
 
In the case of balancing, the best choice for the Philippines seems to be soft-balancing, 
external balancing, and low-intensity balancing. However, since Duterte does not have such 
good relations with the United States as the Philippines used to have, balancing does not 
seem a very likely strategy to use. Since it is not clear that the Philippines will use balancing, 
the author moves to the next possible strategy that is bandwagoning.  
 
1.4 The theory of bandwagoning 
The second possible option for the Philippines is bandwagoning which is a strategy without 
one clear definition (Roy, 2005: 306). One definition is that the state aligns with a threatening 
state to avoid being attacked by it (Walt, 1987: 17). The second definition is that the state 
chooses the winning side in the hope to realize economic gains (Schweller, 1994: 74). Since 
the definitions are different, the use of the strategy depends on which definition is used. In 
the Philippines situation, the first definition is relevant because of their purpose to avoid 
major conflict in the South China Sea. The second definition is applicable because China is 
one of the main trading partners (Duterte, 2019). This strategy also involves a risk of losing 
autonomy because stronger states are politically more dominant (Koga, 2018: 637). To 
ensure minimum security, secondary powers are more likely to bandwagon if they do not 
have any credible allies or partners (Koga 2018, 640).  
 
The Philippines have allied before with the United States, but it is not clear if it will stay that 
way. The Philippines can also hope on the other Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) states who are also their alleys. Since the Philippines have strong allies in the 
region and they are still allied with the United States, bandwagoning does not seem a likely 
strategy to be used. Since the Philippines seem not to use a bandwagoning strategy, the 




1.5 The theory of hedging 
The third possible option is hedging, and according to the literature, this is one of the main 
strategies the Philippines is using (Roy, 2005: 305). Hedging is the most general strategy, 
and it means keeping open several strategic options against the possibility of a future security 
threat (Roy, 2005: 306). In the Philippines situation, this seems the most likely strategy 
because this keeps open the opportunity to stay allied with the United States and cooperate 
with China if needed. According to Goh's definition, hedging is a set of strategies to avoid a 
situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives (Goh, 2005: 
8). Hedging is also defined as a behavior in which a state seeks to offset risks by pursuing 
multiple policy options intended to produce mutually counteracting effects under the 
situation of high-uncertainties and high stakes (Cheng-Schwee, 2008: 163). Hedging may 
also include balancing but not necessarily (Roy, 2005: 306). In the Philippines situation, it 
means that they are hedging, but they might use the United States to balance against China. 
Hedging is located between balancing and bandwagoning and is considered as a third 
strategic choice if the state is choosing a strategy (Koga, 2018: 635). A hedging state is 
strengthening economic cooperation but at the same time also increases military capabilities 
(Koga 2018, 634). The Philippines are trying to increase their military capability by buying 
military equipment from different states, including China (Duterte, 2017). This strategy may 
cause several strategic dilemmas. The purpose is to avoid confrontation with a potentially 
adversarial state (Koga, 2018: 634). Although there are not enough clarifications in the 
definition, and because of that, the concept suffers from a low analytical utility (Koga, 2018: 
634). 
  
To understand the concept of hedging, there need to be done some clarifications. Hedging 
leaves strategic options open, and because of that, it helps to explain the variations in state 
behavior (Koga, 2018: 634). The clarification also helps to identify the geographical area 
where the intensive power competition takes place. Since hedging states are not clarifying 
their strategies, it is essential to understand the geographical area where the competition 
takes place (Koga, 2018: 634). Although great powers are trying to pressure hedging states 
to clarify their political stance, this pressure may create unnecessary tensions (Koga, 2018: 
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634-635). This might cause a possibility that China and the United States are trying to make 
the Philippines choose who to ally with, and this choice may impact the following moves of 
the states. It seems that the Philippines do not want to grow tensions in the South China Sea, 
but they also do not to ally with the United States anymore.  Hedging also tries to avoid 
tensions with a target state and rather be cooperative (Koga, 2018: 636). Since there is a 
potential threat of military escalation in the South China Sea, the Philippines try to avoid 
tension, but they do not want to disclaim their part of the sea. Hedging is useful for states to 
reduce the risks associated with a resolute course of specific strategy (Koga, 2018: 638). 
Hedging is primarily used by the secondary powers in the unipolar world because it is costly 
to balance against the superpower (Koga, 2018: 639). In this thesis context, there are two 
superpowers China and the United States which means that it is not a unipolar world. 
Although it still seems likely that the Philippines are hedging. 
  
In a bipolar system, superpowers balance with each other, and secondary powers experience 
difficulties in strategic ambiguities, so hedging is rarely used (Koga, 2018: 639). Hedging is 
more likely used in a multipolar world by superpowers and secondary powers because power 
is more diffused and distributed (Koga, 2018: 639). Although it might seem that there is only 
China and the United States rivalry, there are also other main actors included in the conflict, 
such as ASEAN states, Japan, and South Korea (Duterte, 2017, 2019). That is another reason 
why hedging strategy may seem likely to be used. Six main patterns can identify hedging 
state behavior: conventional hedging (military balancing/economic bandwagoning), soft 
hedging (diplomatic balancing/economic bandwagoning), economic hedging (military 
bandwagoning/ economic balancing), security hedging (military bandwagoning/diplomatic 
balancing), diplomatic hedging (economic balancing/diplomatic bandwagoning) and 
politico-military hedging (military balancing/diplomatic bandwagoning) (Koga, 2018: 
642).  
 
Since there are different parties included in the South China Sea conflict and one definition 
of hedging is pursuing multiple policy options open, this seems to be the most likely used 
strategy. Whereas there are other possible strategies suitable for a small state, the author 
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discusses them briefly in the next chapter and then makes a final decision which strategy 
seems to be most likely used in the Philippines situation.  
 
1.6 Other possible strategies  
Although it is most likely that the Philippines choose a strategy according to these previously 
discussed three strategies, there are also other options. For example, engagement, buck-
passing, or binding. Engagement is a strategy where a state uses inclusion and rewards to 
attempt dissatisfied power (Roy, 2005: 306). With attempting, the state wants the dissatisfied 
power to accept the rules and institutions of the pre-existing international order (Roy, 2005: 
306). According to Roy, engagement is widely used in Southeast Asia to avoid possible 
domination of China (Roy, 2005: 310). For example, other states encourage the Chinese to 
be part of multilateral organizations, international dialog, and agreements because they do 
not want to exclude China (Roy, 2005: 310).  Excluding China may grow unnecessary 
tensions, and it is more beneficial to socialize China than fight against it. Engagement is 
useful in both ways because it includes benefits for both parties.   
 
Buck-passing is a situation where states avoid balancing by counting on third parties to bear 
the costs of stopping a rising hegemon (Christensen and Snyder, 1990: 138).  It is a strategy 
that works best under multipolarity (Christensen and Snyder, 1990: 138). Buck-passing 
occurs when states can identify actors other than themselves who may challenge the 
influence of the pre-eminent or potentially most threatening state (Christensen and Snyder, 
1990: 141). In that case, the Philippines might hope that the United States or any ASEAN 
state will stop China and they can avoid the conflict.  
  
Binding is a strategy when a weaker state is able to restrain the actions of the powerful state 
through the creation of institutional agreements and frameworks between stronger and 
weaker states (Ian, 2003: 11). In exchange, weaker states support the status quo under the 
leadership of the leading state (Ian, 2003: 11). In the Philippines situation, it means that the 
Philippines may support China or the United States. Binding also permits formal autonomy 
and influence over the powerful state by the weaker states (Ian, 2003: 11). It makes use of 
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the institutional and network linkages available to exert their influence (Ian, 2003: 12). 
Weaker states are not able to do much about their power shortfalls so that they may use 
existing institutional and network relationships with the preponderant state and the rest of 
the world (Ian, 2003: 12). This may help them to preserve or forward their interest (Ian, 
2003: 12). Binding may fit states already in institutions and networks with accepted 
mechanisms that allow some formal channels of influence on the leading state by the weakest 
members (Ian, 2003: 12). For example, it may fit to smaller ASEAN states as well as the 
Philippines. However, the importance of worldwide linkages to the second-tier states makes 
it costly to disrupt the world system (Ian, 2003: 12). That is why this does not seem a likely 
option. Binding may be measured by how formal restraints are allowed on the powerful 
states (Ian, 2003: 12). Indication of binding is a tendency where powerful states adhere to 
institutional restraints in relations with weaker states. (Ian 2003, 12). 
  
Other strategies, such as buffering, bonding, beleaguering, or hiding, are not relevant in this 
research because these are not very suitable for small states, are more suitable in a unipolar 
world, or because of other reasons (Ian, 2003: 1-2). Buffering is a strategy that decreases 
exposure and influence of the more powerful by creating alternative spheres of influence or 
carving out neutral geographical areas or functions (Ian, 2003: 13). A bonding strategy is 
when a state promotes autonomy by providing a function or service indispensable for others 
(Ian, 2003: 10). Beleaguering is when the state's purpose is to undermine the influence and 
authority of the powerful state (Ian, 2003: 12). Undermining may include sowing of discord 
between the stronger power and its allies, instigating domestic unrest within the territory of 
great power, or disturbing the smooth implementation of the policies by the powerful (Ian, 
2003: 13). Hiding is when a state ignores the threat, declares neutrality, or draws into 
isolation (Schroeder, 1994: 117). It appears when states voluntarily withdraw themselves 
from actual disputes and potential disputes by reducing or cutting contact with potential or 
existing adversaries (Ian, 2003: 14).  
 
Based on the previous discussion, the author will define the main possible strategies, which 
are balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. In this research, the author will consider the 
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strategy as balancing if the Philippines cooperate with another state such as the United States 
or ASEAN states since they have the same potential adversary, China. The strategy is 
considered bandwagoning if the Philippines align with China to avoid being attacked by it. 
The classification of hedging will be used in two ways. The first one is if the strategy contains 
several strategies, such as balancing and bandwagoning at the same time in the same year. 
The second one is if the strategy includes multiple options at the same time, such as praising 
both China and the United States at the same speech; strengthening economic cooperation 
and increasing military capabilities; not choosing any specific strategy to keep the options 
open; avoid tensions by not criticizing either China or the United States. Based on the 
definitions, the author states that the Philippines is mainly using the strategy of hedging. The 
strategy will be proven in the empirical part by analyzing the Philippines president Rodrigo 




















2. Empirical part 
In this chapter, the author presents the empirical part of the thesis. In the beginning, there is 
an explanation of the methodology of the thesis. After that author analyses the Philippines 
president Rodrigo Duterte's statements from his speeches, interviews, and press conferences 
from 2016-2020. The chapter ends with a discussion of which strategy the Philippines are 
using in the great power rivalry in Southeast Asia. 
 
2.1 Methodology  
This research was carried out using a qualitative method (Lamont, 2015: 88). The goal of 
this research is to see which strategy the Philippines is using. Are they using balancing, 
bandwagoning, hedging, or another strategy to one of the great powers. In this research, the 
author made content analysis where is empirically analyzed the Philippines' foreign policy 
from the Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte's points of view from the official presidential 
sources. Official sources are Duterte's statements and speeches from the official webpage of 
the government (Lamont, 2015: 88). The main question of this research is how the 
Philippines respond to the changing geopolitical dynamics of the region using the case of 
the South China Sea after 2016. 
 
President Rodrigo Duterte was elected in June 2016. Since then, he has been very 
controversial because of his statements and not typical actions. This work brings out 
Duterte's statements from different speeches, interviews, and press conferences from 2016-
2020. Since the purpose is to see how the Philippines respond to the United States or China, 
there will be analyzed speeches where it is mentioned United States, China, or the South 
China Sea and the attitude towards the states. The relevant information was also the progress 
in the South China Sea.  
 
In the beginning, the author sorted out all speeches related to previously mentioned topics 
starting from 2016. To find suitable speeches, the author looked speeches from bigger 
summits, such as ASEAN summits and summits related to the economy or military. Relevant 
speeches were also those from the meetings while visiting different states, especially 
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meetings with the president of China. There were also used anniversary or celebration 
speeches related to China, the United States, the South China Sea, the Philippines military 
or navy. To use the speech for further analysis, there needed to be relevant information for 
understanding which strategy the Philippines are using. In the beginning, the author found 
24 speeches from 2016, 35 speeches from 2017, 39 speeches from 2018, 21 from 2019, and 
9 from 2020. 2016 and 2020 were different because, in 2016, there were speeches from june 
and not a whole year since Duterte was elected in June. Due to the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, 
most speeches in 2020 were related to the COVID-19 crisis, and there were fewer speeches 
related to the thesis topic.  
 
After the first selection of speeches, there was a second one to sort out the most relevant 
ones and those suitable for further discussion. The purpose was to sort out 3-4 speeches 
every year to continue further analysis. In the final selection, there were 11 speeches from 
2016, 12 speeches from 2017, 12 speeches from 2018, 8 speeches from 2019, and 3 speeches 
from 2020. There are two ways how the speeches have been analyzed. A small part of the 
speech has been quoted in the thesis followed by analyzes, or there is referred to the speech 
in the discussion. There has not been any program used to analyze the speeches, only the 
authors' choice, which are the most relevant speeches. In the background information, there 
is also used other media sources or statistics to find relevant articles about the Philippines' 
relations with the United States and China and information about the South China Sea 
dispute.  
 
2.2 Duterte's statements 2016 
Duterte started his controversial speeches from his inauguration speech on June 30 when he 
said that he knows that there are people who disapprove of his methods, but he also knows 
his limits of power and suggests people to mind their own work (Duterte, June 30, 2016). In 
his speeches, he brings out several problems the Philippines has, and one of the main 
problem is the South China Sea. In Duterte's 2016 statements, the author found the 
indications of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging strategies.  
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2.2.1 Balancing  
The author has found that in 2016 the Philippines sometimes moved towards balancing. 
There are several proofs of balancing found in Duterte's statements. In the following chapter, 
the author refers to Duterte's statements from his speeches which can be considered as 
balancing.  
 
In 2016 Duterte says that security dialogues must deepen to build greater understanding and 
cooperation to pursue a peaceful conflict resolution and management in the South China Sea 
(Duterte, July 25, 2016). He confirms that the Philippines will remain committed to 
international partners and engaged with the international community (Duterte, July 25, 
2016). Since he promises to stay committed with the international partners, there is a 
possibility that there are several states that can balance China. At the beginning of Duterte's 
tenure, he also confirms his alliance with the United States by saying that he will reiterate 
their strong alliance with America (Duterte, August 10, 2016). Duterte says that everybody, 
especially ASEAN states are worried about China and the China Sea conflict that might go 
out of control (Duterte, September 10, 2016). Since other states are also concerned, and 
Duterte emphasizes the importance of cooperation, he might hope that other allies in the 
region and the United States are balancing China. 
 
It was also seen that the Philippines have not very close relations with the United States 
anymore, and the next potential partner is ASEAN (Duterte, November 17, 2016). It means 
that ASEAN states, including the Philippines, can balance against China and solve the 
conflict peacefully through joint cooperation. While visiting China, Duterte gave his word 
that he will cooperate with China, but he also continues the Philippines' independent foreign 
policy (Duterte, November 20, 2016). Since China and the Philippines are both interested in 
the development of Asia, they mutually agreed on many things, including that China is 
leading the economic development (Duterte, November 20, 2016). 
  
Although Duterte does not have as close relations with the United States as they used to 
have, it might change after the elections of the United States president. After the elections, 
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Duterte talked with the new president Donald Trump.  Trump said that they should fix their 
bad relations, and Duterte is doing a great job, although Americans criticize him (Duterte, 
December 7, 2016). When Trump became a new president, there is a possibility that they 
warm up their relations, and the Philippines will balance China with the United States. 
 
2.2.2 Bandwagoning 
The author has found that in 2016, the Philippines sometimes used the strategy of 
bandwagoning. This chapter refers to several statements from Duterte's speeches that will 
prove bandwagoning strategy.  
 
In 2016 Duterte said that China is helping them and America is not, which might be the 
reason why he chooses to cooperate more with China (Duterte, September 9, 2016). At the 
same time, he is against China because of their sea dispute and knows he cannot go to war 
against them. This might be the real reason he accepts China's help, and it refers to 
bandwagoning because one possible option why Duterte is cooperating with China is to 
avoid tensions in the sea dispute.  
"I said a few days ago, few months ago, that I will charter a new course, changing 
direction of the foreign policy and be with friends with everybody and with no 
enemies to contend with, no enemies to hurt, no friends to serve." "So why don't I go 
to China? What kept us from China was not our own making? We are almost a vassal 
state of America. Our foreign policy dovetails the policy of the United States and of 
the West." (Duterte, October 19, 2016) 
The Philippines used to cooperate with the United States, but they changed their course 
towards China when the circumstances changed. Since Duterte said that before, they were 
more dependent on the United States, it seems that they also counted more on their help. 
Since the Philippines' main goal is to avoid conflict in the South China Sea and they do not 
have such good relations with the United States anymore, they need to ensure that the peace 
remains, and one reason to do that is to bandwagon to China.  
“By reducing tensions with China, the president has contributed to the strengthening 
of China-ASEAN cooperation paving the way for other claimants to work on the 
settlement of their own disputes with China, for example Malaysia. With lesser 
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tension in the South China Sea, the U.S. will have difficulties in finding reasons to 
enhance its presence and monitoring in this water." (Duterte, November 17, 2016) 
Duterte has achieved better relationships with China very fast, but this does not mean that 
he would forget the dispute and disclaim the Philippines part of the sea. It can be a sign of 
bandwagoning because warming up the relations with China is one possible way to avoid 
conflict. Duterte says that by reducing tensions with China, they can work on the settlement 
of their disputes which means they are bandwagoning to solve the dispute.   
 
2.2.3 Hedging  
Since the Philippines used both balancing and bandwagoning, it can be said that the main 
strategy in 2016 was hedging. The author also found other proofs to confirm the strategy of 
hedging.  
 
The proof of hedging is that Duterte makes it clear that cooperation is crucial. He also 
emphasizes that the Philippines pursue their own independent foreign policy (Duterte, 
September 10, 2016). This refers to hedging because saying that they are cooperating and 
also having their own foreign policy keeps the options open for different options. In October, 
Duterte visits China and mentions it in his speech. 
"We'll look forward to renewing the ties of friendship between the Philippines and 
China, and to reaffirm the commitment to work closer to achieve shared goals for 
our countries and peoples. As we mark this year of the 41st anniversary of the 
establishment relations between China and the Philippines, we will look at the sum 
total of our relationships. We shall seek ways to strengthen cooperation, particularly 
to intensify two-way trade and investments." (Duterte, October 16, 2016). 
This speech refers to hedging because there are several strategies used. Duterte wants to have 
a closer friendship with China which can be interpreted as bandwagoning because he might 
hope that this will help him prevent the conflict. He also wants to tighten the economic 
cooperation between the Philippines and China, which can be interpreted as hedging. It is 
not clear whether Duterte wants to intensify the relations because of economic cooperation, 
which would refer to hedging, or is he afraid that China will escalate the South China Sea 




Since the Philippines and the United States' relations are not so close anymore, the 
Philippines need allies in the South China Sea disputes. There is a possibility to cooperate 
more with ASEAN or neighboring states. Duterte said that they will be friends with 
everybody and have no enemies (Duterte, October 19, 2016). It refers to hedging because 
being friends with everybody also means keeping several different options open. The more 
states are in favor of the decision made by an arbitrary court and do not want war, the more 
secure the Philippines' position is. The more allies they have in the region and the better 
relations with China, the less they need the United States. 
 
These findings confirm that in 2016 the main strategy the Philippines used was hedging. In 
the next chapter, the author brings out statements from 2017. 
 
2.3 Duterte's statements 2017 
In 2017 Duterte continued his rhetorics to move towards China, but he also did not forget 
the United States. In Duterte's 2017 statements, the author found the indication of hedging.  
 
2.3.1 Hedging 
The author has found that in 2017, the Philippines used the strategy of hedging. This chapter 
refers to several statements from Duterte's speeches that will prove hedging strategy.  
 
Duterte said that he asked China if they can patrol the international waters without intruding 
into countries' territorial waters because the Philippines would be glad if China is presented 
there (Duterte, January 31, 2017). He also mentions that he is not guilty about their worsened 
relations with the United States (Duterte, February 2, 2017). He said that the United States 
started it, and now they are saying that the Philippines and the United States relations are 
bad because of Duterte's rhetorics (Duterte, February 2, 2017). In that case, Duterte is not 
against the United States, but the United States was against Duterte, which is why their 
relations worsened. Now when there is a new president who is not against Duterte, they 
might start to cooperate again, which can also be a sign of hedging because Duterte keeps 
his options open for China and the United States. Duterte said that China used to keep the 
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distance because the Philippines were dovetailing the United States' foreign policy, but 
Duterte wants to make friends with everybody (Duterte, February 10, 2017). By saying that, 
it is seen that Duterte does not want to pick sides, but he wants to be friends with everybody. 
Duterte admits that he cannot stop China from what they are doing, and since China is 
helping the Philippines to improve their economy, Duterte is even more friendly towards 
China (Duterte, March 19, 2017). Since Duterte knows he has no chance against China in 
case of a war, it seems likely that he is bandwagoning. However, they are also tightening 
their economic relations, which can be interpreted as hedging. Duterte knows he cannot 
afford to go to war and does not want to do that. In 2017 he also went to China.  
"I went to China, I said, Mr. Xi Jinping, I am here to shake your hands. I am not 
asking for anything, I just want to trade with you because you seem to be far away. 
And he said because you stick your, the foreign policy seems to be just a dovetail of 
what America wants. So I said I will adopt and then align the foreign policy but I 
would like to trade with you and please help us." (Duterte, March 24, 2017) 
After the president of China said that Duterte depends too much on the United States, Duterte 
was ready to change that, which mean he wants to keep several options open. The economic 
cooperation between China and the Philippines also refers to hedging. It seems that he does 
not want to cut the relation with the United States totally but be friends with both of them. 
With the United States because they can help the Philippines to balance against China and 
with China to avoid the escalation in the sea. 
"But we remain friends with America, but I am chartering a new course. We are at 
our best level of friendship with China after I went there." "At any time during my 
term, we will have to talk about the arbitration of the China Sea. And when that time 
comes, I would present to you the judgment on all four corners of the paper and we 
will not talk about anything except the China." (Duterte, March 29, 2017) 
It seems that Duterte is planning to make his move and tries to find a final solution in the 
South China Sea dispute. If Duterte previously said he is aligning his foreign policy with 
China, he also confirms that he will stay friends with the United States. There might be a 
possibility that after Trump was elected, the Philippines and the United States relations will 
be warmer. Although Duterte said that he has not entirely accepted Trump because he is tied 
up (Duterte, May 1, 2017). He also said that he was not distancing before, but it was rather 
a rift because Obama was against Duterte (Duterte, May 1, 2017). After visiting China, 
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Duterte said that China wants to help them, but it might fall out because the Philippines are 
identified with the United States. 
  
Duterte confirmed that he would like to chart his own course, but he also stays friends with 
the United States because they have many things between them, and he has to think of his 
state first (Duterte, May 13, 2017). While choosing the course, Duterte shows that he has not 
chosen the side and uses a hedging strategy. He says that if America is willing to fight, they 
are also ready to fight, although it would be a massacre, and he also brings out that America 
is the only superpower that can go against China (Duterte, May 19, 2017). Duterte also says 
that he has nothing against America, but he does not like their double standards and refuses 
to deal with them (Duterte, May 19, 2017). After that, he states that they were following the 
American foreign policy, but now he is starting his own (Duterte, May 19, 2017). He also 
says that the independence of the Philippines foreign policy allows them to broaden the 
horizons of friendship with other states because overdependence on traditional partners has 
limited their cooperation opportunities. (Duterte, May 22, 2017). This means that he is not 
only keeping options open for China and the United States but also to other states, which 
again refers to hedging. 
"But the problem, I said, is I do not want to criticize the big powers now because it 
was really of their own making." "But nobody, really… well, once in a while, raised 
a howl. You know, China is building, but his --- but her promises are peaceful. So in 
the meantime, I said, since there is no space to talk about a violent option, let us just 
continue.” (Duterte, October 31, 2017) 
By not criticizing the great powers, the Philippines Duterte again shows the strategy of 
hedging. Although he is trying to be friends with everybody, he is also preparing to go to 
war because he is trying to buy or lend military equipment from different states (Duterte 
November 7, 2017). Duterte has got arms from China and emphasizes that China is very 
kind and gave them additional firearms, but he also says that the Philippines remain best 
friends with America (Duterte November 7, 2017). In addition to China, many other states 
claim the sea, and Duterte sees that the potential of military conflict rises (Duterte November 
7, 2017). Since the Philippines are trying to raise their military capability, it also shows that 
they are using a hedging strategy. However, it seems controversial because Duterte is buying 
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military equipment to fight against China in the South China Sea and at the same time says 
that they are friends with China. 
  
These findings confirm that in 2017 the main strategy the Philippines used was hedging. In 
the next chapter, the author brings out statements from 2018. 
 
2.4 Duterte's statements 2018 
Duterte has realized that the potential of the conflict is rising, and it seems likely that he will 
continue his strategy of hedging so that he does not need to pick sides and can hope that 
there will be a peaceful solution. In Duterte's 2018 statements, the author found the 
indication of balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, and engaging.  
 
2.4.1 Balancing 
The author has found that in 2018, the Philippines used the strategy of balancing. This 
chapter refers to several statements from Duterte's speeches that will prove balancing 
strategy.  
 
In 2018 Duterte confirms again that they have good relations with the United States, and 
since they have a military alliance, they cannot enter into another military alliance with any 
other state because there can be only one (Duterte, February 19, 2018). Since they already 
have a strong alliance and the Philippines cannot enter into another one, this might mean 
that the Philippines need to use the United States to balance against China rather than find 
other options. The next day after Duterte said that he has nothing against China, he said that 
he could declare war on China tonight (Duterte, May 16, 2018). So far, he has always said 
that he wants peace in the region, and he is not going to war with China because it will be a 
massacre. However, Duterte is worried that he does not have the assurance that America will 
remain by their side if there should be a war (Duterte, May 19, 2018). This means that even 
if the Philippines would like to balance against China with the United States, they cannot be 




Although Duterte has previously said that the Philippines has a strong alliance, he also has 
controversial feelings about them, and it seems he does not completely trust the United 
States. Duterte said that he feels that he does not want to talk to the United States because 
one president is berating and another one is praising him (Duterte, September 4, 2018). On 
the other hand, he also says that he is a friend, and Trump is his idol (Duterte, September 4, 
2018). It seems that the relations between the Philippines and the United States are changing, 
and they are having better relations with the United States because of Trump. It might mean 
that they will try to balance together against China. 
 
2.4.2 Bandwagoning 
The author has found that in 2018, the Philippines used the strategy of bandwagoning. This 
chapter refers to several statements from Duterte's speeches that will prove bandwagoning 
strategy.  
 
In the ASEAN conference, Duterte confirmed that they stand together with China, fight 
against the same problems, and are ready to work with all states in the region to seek friends 
(Duterte, April 10, 2018). From China's perspective, saying something like that at a big 
conference might increase the Philippines' credibility. However, Duterte might say that only 
to avoid the conflict with China, which again refers to bandwagoning.  
"If there is any power now on planet Earth who can deal with that problem, it is 
America. But America never lifted a finger." "Hey, guy! You're not supposed to build 
something in the midst of water especially artificial construction" "Now, we can 
always appeal to the other nations for a concession. And you know what, however 
you look at China, I consider China a friend." "It's geopolitics actually. That's why I 
went out of my way to make friends with China." (Duterte, April 29, 2018) 
In 2018 Duterte says that he cannot deal with the South China Sea problem, which is why 
he went to make friends with China. Since he realizes that the United States is not dealing 
with the problem and has not found any other solutions, he finds bandwagoning more 




2.4.3 Hedging  
Since the Philippines used both balancing and bandwagoning, it can be said that the main 
strategy in 2018 was hedging. The author also found other proofs to confirm the strategy of 
hedging.  
"We are neutral, we will continue to talks with China. This is not the time to be 
fighting over the South China Sea because it only would lead into a war." "But just 
the same ,we cannot fight America, just like China. I'll just keep quiet." "They are 
competing for a world superpower in the next centuries to come." (Duterte, February 
9, 2018) 
Duterte understands that China and America are competing to be the next superpower. Not 
criticizing the superpowers and keeping quiet also refers to the hedging strategy. Since he 
has said that the Philippines are friends with both of them, he might want to stay out of this 
because he wants to avoid war. Duterte brings out that China builds structures and military 
bases in the South China Sea (Duterte, February 19, 2018). Although it is not intended for 
the Philippines but for those who Chinese think would destroy them, which is the United 
States (Duterte, February 19, 2018). Duterte plans to stay out of the great power rivalry 
because he is not going into a battle he cannot win (Duterte, February 19, 2018). China is 
giving firearms for free, and Duterte says that he needs China's help, he is not ashamed to 
admit it, and they maintain good relations (Duterte, February 19, 2018). However, Duterte 
has more reasons to have better relations with China because the United States is not selling 
them military equipment, but China gives them for free (Duterte, February 19, 2018). By 
increasing the military equipment, Duterte again confirms the strategy of hedging. 
 
Duterte admits that the United States is the only one who can fight against China, but he is 
worried because they are not doing anything (Duterte, April 29, 2018). Previously he was 
critical towards the United States because they stayed in the waters of the South China sea, 
and now he is critical because the United States is not doing anything (Duterte, April 29, 
2018). If he previously said that he is not criticizing the superpowers, he criticizes both China 
and the United States. Duterte is very passionate about improving the economy, and he wants 
to trade with everybody. His plan might not work out because he says that for the free trade 
agreement, he has to sign a document that says that if you are trading with America, you 
28 
 
cannot trade with China (Duterte, October 18, 2018). Hoping to strengthen the economic 
cooperation also refers to hedging. Duterte also said that he'd be neutral, but after that, he 
went to China (Duterte, October 18, 2018). This again refers to hedging because saying that 
he is neutral keeps open the options for cooperation for several states, and going to China 
keeps open good relations with China.  
 
2.4.4 Engaging 
The author has found that in 2018, the Philippines used in addition to balancing, 
bandwagoning, and hedging the engaging strategy. This chapter refers to several statements 
from Duterte's speeches that will prove engaging strategy.  
"Our improved relationship with China, however, does not mean that we will waver 
in our commitment to defend our interests in the West Philippine Sea. This is why we 
engage China through bilateral and multilateral platforms such as the ASEAN-China 
and the Philippines China Bilateral Consultation Mechanism." (July 23, 2018) 
If Duterte previously gave vague answers, he now clearly says that he uses the strategy of 
engagement. The reason might be that he realized his previous strategies did not work so 
well as he hoped, and he is testing other strategies to have better chances to win in the South 
China Sea dispute. 
 
The Philippines is a Country Coordinator of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations until 2021, 
and Duterte emphasizes that they are committed to work with all parties in the negotiations 
and conclusion of the Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (Duterte, 
November 13, 2018). The ASEAN-China dialogue refers to engagement again because 
having more close relations with China can prevent the attack on the other parties included 
in the South China Sea dispute. Duterte affirms that this cooperation includes peaceful 
settlement, the exercise of self-restraint, freedom of navigation, and overflight in accordance 
with the international law, especially the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(Duterte, November 13, 2018). Duterte affirms that ASEAN and China will continue to 
reaffirm the importance of maintaining and enhancing promoting peace, security, stability, 
safety, freedom of navigation and overflight, mutual trust and confidence, exercising self-
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restraint in the conduct of activities, avoid tensions that may further complicate the situation 
and pursue a peaceful solution of disputes in accordance with international law including the 
1982 UNCLOS (Duterte, November 14, 2018). Duterte says that for the first time, ASEAN 
and China successfully completed an ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise, which is a valuable 
confidence-building measure, strengthens practical cooperation, builds mutual trust, 
friendship, and understanding amongst ASEAN and Chinese navies (Duterte, November 14, 
2018). China and ASEAN also issued ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, 
which will provide a strategic roadmap for ASEAN-China cooperation (Duterte, November 
14, 2018). This will complement many ASEAN-China agreements made through the years 
and the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic 
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016-2020) (Duterte, November 14, 2018). This 
partnership seems to be made, hoping that there will be a peaceful solution to the conflict, 
and while engaging China, they are less violent. 
 
These findings confirm that in 2018 the main strategy the Philippines used was again 
hedging. In the next chapter, the author brings out statements from 2019. 
 
2.4 Duterte's statements 2019 
In 2019 Duterte is still emphasizing the same problems. He wants to buy military equipment 
from the United States, but since they refused to deliver, he asked the same thing from China, 
and China gave everything for free (Duterte, march 6, 2019). The more China is giving them 
money and equipment, the better are the relations. Although they have not solved the South 
China Sea dispute, they have managed to keep their friendship. In Duterte's 2019 statements, 
the author found the indication of hedging. 
 
2.4.1 Hedging 
The author has found that in 2019, the Philippines used the strategy of hedging. This chapter 




Duterte said that the Philippines and China must continue their work together and explore 
new cooperation and partnership areas because they have a strong desire to further deepen 
their engagement (Duterte, April 25, 2019).  Duterte is glad that the Philippines and China 
have elevated their relations, and it seems that they will keep that course. China is the 
Philippines' largest trading partner, and their growing economic exchanges can only 
strengthen the friendship (Duterte, April 26, 2019). Increasing military capability and 
strengthening economic cooperation is again a sign of hedging.  Duterte brings out that all 
these problems about the South China Sea could have been avoided if the United States had 
intervened at that time when China was weak (Duterte, June 26, 2019). Now he is blaming 
the Americans that he had to go to China (Duterte, august 6, 2019). It seems that now when 
China has grown their military capability, no one wants to go against them, and Duterte 
again accuses both China and the United States.  
 
Duterte wants to avoid the conflict, but it is not easy because he also wants to protect their 
territorial waters (Duterte, July 22, 2019). He went to China and said that he wants to go to 
his territory and dig oil, but he got the response that it can mean trouble (Duterte, July 22, 
2019). It seems even more complicated because the Philippines ownership of the sea is 
internationally recognized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the Arbitral Award in the case of People --- "Republic of the Philippines vs. 
People's Republic of China" (Duterte, July 22, 2019). However, it says that another state 
may utilize the resource found in the Exclusive Economic Zone (Duterte, July 22, 2019).  
 
He is cooperating with China, but they have not signed any military treaties or agreements 
because the Philippines have a treaty with the United States, and it forbids getting another 
one (Duterte, august 6, 2019). This means that the Philippines are balancing against China 
with the United States and at the same time bandwagoning with China, which can be 
interpreted as hedging. 
 
While his visit to China, Duterte said that he wants to dig oil, he got the answer that China 
is privileged to be friends with the Philippines, but this is the conflict they cannot solve 
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overnight (Duterte, august 6, 2019). If the United States has done anything previously, he 
should not have gone there because there would not be a problem. Duterte hopes that during 
the Philippines' tenure as the coordinator of China-ASEAN relations they will conclude the 
Code of Conduct and maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea (Duterte, august 
30, 2019). It becomes more evident now that Duterte cannot do anything about the situation 
because they cannot go to war, and China is not retreating. It seems that he can only hope 
that some other state is doing something or will propose a solution which again refers to 
hedging because it will keep all the options open.  
“The South Koreans are also against the occupation of the South China Sea and the 
claim of China. This will be taken up because one day, when we decide to really go 
for it, it will be the Western powers plus Seoul, plus Tokyo, and Australia. Malaysia 
--- I do not know if… I'm not sure of Malaysia if they'll join the fray. Philippines, 
Philippines." "I will decide when the time comes. I will not make any guarantees 
because I said we do not have the even the firepower and I will never commit to 
something which will just you know massacre." (Duterte, November 19, 2019) 
It seems that when the time comes, Duterte hopes to balance China with western states on 
the question of the South China Sea. Since China has a more significant military capability, 
it takes many other states to balance the power, but it must be sure that all the other states 
are ready to go into that conflict. Although at the same time, he also says that he will decide 
what to do when the time comes. This refers to hedging again because he leaves the options 
open.  
 
These findings confirm that in 2019 the main strategy the Philippines used was hedging. In 
the next chapter, the author brings out statements from 2020. 
 
2.6 Duterte's statements 2020 
Due to the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, there is less discussion about the South China Sea 
dispute, but the potential conflict still remains. Duterte has previously said that there will be 
a solution to this conflict during his tenure. He has been president for more than four years, 
but there is still no clear solution, and the threat of a military conflict is still alive. In Duterte's 





The author has found that in 2020, the Philippines used the strategy of balancing. This 
chapter refers to several statements from Duterte's speeches that will prove balancing 
strategy. It seems that by 2020 Duterte has realized that balancing with the United States is 
not enough and calls for other states.  
"I therefore call on the stakeholders in the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, 
the Middle East and Africa: if we cannot be friends as yet, then in God's name, let us 
not hate each other too much." "The Philippines affirms that commitment in the South 
China Sea in accordance with UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award. The Award is 
now part of international law, beyond compromise and beyond the reach of passing 
governments to dilute, diminish or abandon. We firmly reject attempts to undermine 
it." (Duterte, September 22, 2020)  
If Duterte was previously trying to fix the situation bilaterally with China or with the United 
States, he seems to understand that this strategy is not working very well. He pressures the 
ASEAN states now and issues the dispute in his speech in the United Nations General 
Assembly (Duterte, September 22, 2020). It seems that he hopes they can do something 
about the situation. He says that the South China Sea issue is ASEAN's strategic challenge, 
and they have to deal with this matter with haste as a community (Duterte, November 12, 
2020). It seems that Duterte sees the ASEAN states as the best option to balance China to 
have a peaceful solution and finally solve the conflict because it has been a long time without 
any solution. He emphasizes again that the dispute must be solved peacefully in accordance 
with international law, including UNCLOS, because the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South 
China Sea is an authoritative interpretation on the application of UNCLOS, and since it is 
now part of international law, it cannot be diminished or ignored by any state (Duterte, 
November 12, 2020). Duterte affirms that they are all committed to the immediate 
conclusion of a substantive and effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea because 
it has been a long time and a long wait (Duterte, November 12, 2020). It seems that Duterte 
is hoping that ASEAN will do something about the issue because it is not only the 







The author has found that in 2020, the Philippines used the strategy of hedging. This chapter 
refers to several statements from Duterte's speeches that will prove hedging strategy.  
Including the South China Sea conflict, there is now another urgent and challenging issue 
that needs a solution, and states need to prioritize where to focus because they cannot solve 
everything simultaneously. Although the primary purpose is to fight against the COVID-19 
crisis, the South China Sea problem has not gone. One possible option is that if the states are 
engaged with the COVID-19 crisis, they are not giving attention to what is going in the South 
China Sea, and that is China's opportunity to make their move. However, it does not seem 
likely because China is also wildly affected by the COVID-19 situation.  
"I have nothing against America, I have nothing against China but if you put bases 
here, you will double the spectacle of a most destructive thing just like Manila during 
the Second World War --- during the retaking of this city." "Now, plenty of critics, 
both sides, claim about nothing has been done to retake forcefully or physically the 
South China Sea. Alam mo, unless we are prepared to go to war, I would suggest 
that we better just call off and treat this, I said, with diplomatic endeavors.” (Duterte, 
July 27, 2020) 
In 2020 Duterte said again that he has nothing against the United States or China. He also 
suggests using diplomatic endeavors. It seems that although Duterte has previously said that 
the Philippines have their own independent foreign policy and he has started his own course, 
he also admits that he might have to choose between China and the United States. This leaves 
open cooperation with both parties, which can be interpreted as hedging.  
"The Philippines particularly looks forward to enhanced engagement in maritime 
security. Our disputes in the [South] China Sea may seem intractable. But they are 
not greater than our combined capacity to manage and solve. Let us [not] make the 
South China Sea another locus --- or let us not --- a locus of power play. It is a 
dangerous game to play and one without a victor. Let us lower tensions, not raise 
them; build confidence rather than doubts; listen and understand instead of 
threaten.". (Duterte, November 14, 2020). 
It seems that since Duterte has realized that the potential war is not going to disappear and 
he is gathering allies to balance China. Since he is not sure about the United States, the next 
best option are ASEAN states, and he emphasizes that together they can win China. Duterte 
hopes to engage states to enhance maritime security. He also calls for the ASEAN state to 
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cooperate to solve the dispute, which seems to refer to balancing. While using engaging and 
balancing, this refers to several strategies, which means hedging.  
 
2.6.3 Engaging  
The author has found that in 2020, the Philippines used the strategy of engaging. This chapter 
refers to several statements from Duterte's speeches that will prove engaging strategy. It 
seems that since Duterte has realized that the potential war is not going to disappear and he 
hopes to engage states to enhance maritime security. 
"The Great Powers will continue to draw us into their respective camps. We should 
continue to nimbly engage them in ways that most [benefit us]. We must insist on an 
open and rules-based international order that gives all countries – large or small – 
not just one voice, but an equal standing." (Duterte, June 26, 2020) 
In 2020 Duterte said again that they are using engaging in a most beneficial way to the 
Philippines. Although engagement has been used few times, it is still not a very common 
strategy. The reason might be that other strategies are usually more efficient. Although 
engaging can sometimes be used, and since Duterte said that they should engage states in 
the most beneficial way, this leaves open the chance that if he finds the way to do it might 
have a positive impact.  
 
These findings confirm that in 2020 the main strategy the Philippines used was hedging. 
During the past years, there were mainly used different types of hedging. There were used 
balancing, bandwagoning, engaging, and hedging simultaneously in the same year, which 
can be interpreted as hedging. There was also used criticizing China and the United States 
simultaneously and avoiding tensions by not criticizing either China or the United States. 
During these years, there were several times mentioned strengthening economic cooperation 
and increasing military capabilities. Finally, cooperating with several states and not choosing 
any specific strategy for keeping the options open was another form of hedging. This means 
that the main strategy used by the Philippines in 2016-2020 was hedging. In the next chapter, 




During Duterte's four and a half years long tenure from 2016-2020, he has said many times 
that the Philippines have their own foreign policy and that the Philippines are changing the 
course. On one day, he is best friends with China, on the next with the United States, and on 
the third day, he does not want to know anything about them and emphasizes the importance 
of cooperation between ASEAN states. During these years, one thing has remained the same: 
the need for a peaceful solution and commitment to international law. Duterte's statements 
during these years refer mainly to hedging because his cooperation plans and strategies have 
changed a lot during these years, and it seems he is keeping all the options open. 
 
There has been a shift in his statements during his tenure, and it is interesting to see how it 
is going forward. In 2016 he seemed very confident and emphasized that he will change the 
course and have his own foreign policy where he does not need to depend on others. He is 
mentioning the South China Sea dispute a lot and affirms that it needs to be solved. He also 
is warming up the relations with China and is moving away from the United States. He 
praises the president of China a lot because he is helping to improve the Philippines' 
economy and is ready to help the Philippines. He is critical about the United States for not 
helping them and because of their historical background. However, there seemed to be a 
change after the elections in the United States because Duterte likes Trump more than he 
liked the previous president Obama. Duterte hopes to strengthen the relationship with China 
more but is also not disclaiming the South China Sea. He was very straightforward while 
meeting the president of China and said that there must be a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
The main strategy in 2016 was hedging because there were signs of balancing, 
bandwagoning and hedging.   
 
In 2017 he continued to strengthen the relations with China but was also mentioning the 
United States more. He said that he is not the reason why the Philippines and the United 
States relations have worsened. It might be that after the elections of Trump, he feels that he 
wants to warm up the relations with the United States as well because, in case of a conflict 
with China, the United States is the best ally to them. It is seen that he wants to stay friends 
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with both China and the United States. At the same time, he also confirms that he is having 
his own course of foreign policy. He hopes to find a peaceful solution because China seems 
to be a friend, and he hopes that they can solve the dispute by talking. It might be complicated 
to be best friends with China and with the United States. Since Duterte was not so critical of 
the United States anymore, it might be that he realized that he needs to have good relations 
with them if there should be an escalation of the conflict in the South China Sea. Since the 
United States and China have different interests in the region and are on the opposite sides, 
it seems that in 2017 the Philippines' main strategy was bandwagoning and hedging, which 
can be interpreted as hedging. Currently, Duterte can be friends with both states, but in case 
of a conflict, he needs to choose. Until that time, he does not need to clarify his position.  
 
In 2018 Duterte said that he would be neutral and quiet. He understands the competition 
between China and the United States, and he wants to stay out of it. China is giving military 
equipment to the Philippines for free. It seems to be China's strategy to win the Philippines' 
support because they need weapons, and the United States is not selling anything to them. 
At the same time, Duterte has a military alliance with the United States, and he cannot enter 
into another alliance because of that. Since the possibility of an escalation of the conflict is 
not gone, Duterte emphasizes that he is talking to China and tries to solve the situation 
peacefully. He knows he cannot go to war, but there seem to be no signs of China retreating 
from the conflict. China is postponing the discussion about the situation, the United States 
is not doing anything although they have the capability, and the Philippines cannot do 
anything. There was ASEAN-China bilateral consultation, but during that, there was also no 
solution. It seems that Duterte hopes that involving ASEAN states might influence to find 
the solution. One possibility is that if more parties are involved, the problem will be solved, 
and Duterte does not need to make a decision. In his speeches in 2018, he says that they are 
trying to engage China and by ASEAN-China partnership, this might be one strategy to use 
to have a solution. By improving the ASEAN-China partnership engagement, there was 
added new strategy on engaging. There were also used balancing, bandwagoning, and 
hedging, which again refers to a hedging strategy.  
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In 2019 Duterte continues to strengthen the relations with China. He hopes to find new areas 
of partnership and cooperation for deepening their engagement. They are also improving 
their economic cooperation, and this enhances their friendship. However, the South China 
Sea dispute has not gone anywhere and is stressing the states. Duterte is worried about China 
and the United States trade war and is afraid of the escalation of the conflict. He hopes that 
the United States will do something and is accusing them of not doing anything previously. 
He also went to China to talk to the president about the situation. Although China and the 
Philippines have become close friends, the president of China said that if Duterte is going to 
dig oil in the sea, this can mean trouble, which sounds like threatening. The Philippines' 
tenure as the coordinator of China-ASEAN relations will continue, and Duterte hopes that 
there will be a peaceful solution. Since there have not been any moves to a possible solution, 
Duterte starts to seem more hopeless. After the ASEAN-China bilateral talks, he seems to 
hope that this might be the chance for a solution. On the one hand, it seems that Duterte 
continues the engagement strategy. On the other hand, it seems that he is trying to balance 
China with the ASEAN states. Since there are several options, it can be said that in 2019 the 
main strategy was hedging.  
 
In 2020 the main issue was the COVID-19 crisis, and the potential conflict in the South 
China Sea got less attention. Although Duterte said at the beginning of his tenure that there 
would be a solution by 2020, there is still no solution. It seems that he has given up because 
his efforts to be friends with China or cooperate with the United States or ASEAN have not 
helped to get the solution. He affirms that the COVID-19 crisis has only worsened the 
relations between the United States and China. Duterte spoke about the South China Sea 
issue more widely in 2020. He called for other states in the United Nations General 
Assembly to pay attention to this issue and find a peaceful solution. Since he has understood 
that he cannot fight against China alone and the situation cannot stay that way forever, he is 
trying to get as many allies as possible, starting from ASEAN states to all the states in the 
United Nations. He seems to hope that together they can solve the conflict peacefully. 
However, China has not shown any signs of withdrawal. It seems that Duterte does not have 
any new ideas anymore on how to respond to the situation because he has tried different 
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strategies, and nothing has improved the situation. On the positive side, the situation has not 
escalated to a military conflict as well. In 2020 the main strategy again seemed to be hedging 
because there were used several strategies which can be interpreted as hedging. 
 
After discussing several strategies in different years, the author confirms that the Philippines 
mainly use hedging strategy. However, this was not the only strategy because there has also 
been used balancing, bandwagoning, and engaging. According to the theoretical part, several 
statements were found every year to confirm the use of balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, 























The situation in the South China Sea has been constantly tense in the years 2016-2020. 
Although Duterte has tried to solve the dispute peacefully using different strategies, it has 
not given any concrete solution. China is still claiming the South China Sea, and the 
Philippines are still claiming their part of the sea. Neither ASEAN states nor the United 
States has not made any concrete moves, and all parties are just stating the fact that there is 
a dispute and it needs to be solved. 
 
The aim of this theses was to find out which strategy the Philippines are using and how they 
are responding to the changing geopolitical dynamics after 2016. The author set a hypothesis 
that the Philippines are mainly using the strategy of hedging. To test the hypothesis, there 
was done a content analysis about the speeches from 2016-2020 of the Philippines president 
Rodrigo Duterte. The speeches were found on the official presidential webpage. The author 
chose speeches related to China, United States, and the South China Sea.  
 
The author discovered that the Philippines are using different strategies and, according to 
Duterte's speeches and statements, explained which strategy was used. Every year, there 
were selected the most relevant speeches to define the strategy. In the discussion part, the 
author brought out mainly used strategies every year. According to the hedging strategy, 
which has several definitions, such as keeping open several options, and since it is a 
somewhat unclear strategy, it can be said that the Philippines are mainly using hedging. It 
also proves the hypothesis that the main strategy the Philippines are using in the great power 
rivalry is hedging.  
 
In the Philippines, at the changing geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia, the strategies 
changed every year. However, the main strategy was hedging which means that the 
Philippines used the strategy of several strategies. This finding is important because it 
confirms that small states tend to hedge, and it also gives an example to other small states. 
In future research, there is a possibility to find out how the next president of the United States 
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